Through her description of action and speech here, Arendt creates this idea that action is fundamental not to the “what” of humankind but to the “who” of individual humans; action makes us distinct and defines the individual as an extension of and an addition to simple speech. Additionally, action is a way of disclosing our self to the world. “This disclose of ‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is — his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide— is implicit in everything somebody says and does” (179). This puts action (and speech) in a separate category from labor and work, because labor attends to the biological necessities that make us all human, highlighting our sameness in that regard. Only through action and speech can individuality be disclosed to the work, separate from necessity.
However, this point, at least to me, isn’t particularly controversial or interesting. Taking all this at face value, Arendt’s point action action distinguishes individuality is logical and immediately understandable. That said, I find the two failures/shortcomings of action that Arendt highlights - unpredictability and irreversibility - more interesting, because of the frustrations action creates and the potential solutions to such frustrations.
Arendt describes the “predicament of irreversibility” as “being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing” (237). Unpredictability, to Arendt, is the “chaotic uncertainty of the future” (237). Arendt proposes two solutions for irreversibility and unpredictability: the faculties of forgiving and making and keeping promises. I find these solutions particularly interesting; in earlier philosophies that we looked at (Platonic thought, Aristotelian thought, Stoicism, Christianity under Augustine), the solution to problems stemming from physical action seemed to be allowing mental and cognitive faculties to control physical action entirely. For Plato, allowing reason to control physical action would elevate an individual past and away from the action itself, and Aristotle posited a similar position of ordering the self. Augustine wanted us to seek the city of God rather than be content with the material city - seeking a higher divine power resolved any sort of real consequences of our actions. Stoicism advocated stepping back from the idea of action (or rather, reaction) altogether, so as to limit the potential consequences of taking any action. All of these solutions share the quality of being internal — ordering oneself, individually seeking divine enlightenment, and mitigating one’s own emotions and reactions — and by virtue of that, these solutions are only dependent on the individual and require no further ‘action’ as Arendt specifically defines action.
However, Arendt’s solutions to these issues of irreversibility and unpredictability aren’t found in moving away from the action itself; instead, the faculties of forgiving and promising are found in interaction with others (forgiving others and relying on others to forgive you, promising to others and accepting promises from others), and as such, these solutions are found in further action. As Arendt specifically puts it, “both faculties. . . depends on plurality, on the presence and acting of others, for no one can forgive himself and no one can fed bound by a promise made only to himself” (238). Where previous philosophies limited action to prevent its inherent frustrations, Arendt’s philosophy acknowledges the problems of acting and turns to inherent faculties for a solution. So while Arendt might reemphasize the idea behind a Greek polis with regard to private and public spheres, I think that her ultimate direction is to turn on Plato’s idea of ordering the self and instead seeks to use action as a liberating element of self, prompting interaction on both a social and political level.
However, this point, at least to me, isn’t particularly controversial or interesting. Taking all this at face value, Arendt’s point action action distinguishes individuality is logical and immediately understandable. That said, I find the two failures/shortcomings of action that Arendt highlights - unpredictability and irreversibility - more interesting, because of the frustrations action creates and the potential solutions to such frustrations.
Arendt describes the “predicament of irreversibility” as “being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing” (237). Unpredictability, to Arendt, is the “chaotic uncertainty of the future” (237). Arendt proposes two solutions for irreversibility and unpredictability: the faculties of forgiving and making and keeping promises. I find these solutions particularly interesting; in earlier philosophies that we looked at (Platonic thought, Aristotelian thought, Stoicism, Christianity under Augustine), the solution to problems stemming from physical action seemed to be allowing mental and cognitive faculties to control physical action entirely. For Plato, allowing reason to control physical action would elevate an individual past and away from the action itself, and Aristotle posited a similar position of ordering the self. Augustine wanted us to seek the city of God rather than be content with the material city - seeking a higher divine power resolved any sort of real consequences of our actions. Stoicism advocated stepping back from the idea of action (or rather, reaction) altogether, so as to limit the potential consequences of taking any action. All of these solutions share the quality of being internal — ordering oneself, individually seeking divine enlightenment, and mitigating one’s own emotions and reactions — and by virtue of that, these solutions are only dependent on the individual and require no further ‘action’ as Arendt specifically defines action.
However, Arendt’s solutions to these issues of irreversibility and unpredictability aren’t found in moving away from the action itself; instead, the faculties of forgiving and promising are found in interaction with others (forgiving others and relying on others to forgive you, promising to others and accepting promises from others), and as such, these solutions are found in further action. As Arendt specifically puts it, “both faculties. . . depends on plurality, on the presence and acting of others, for no one can forgive himself and no one can fed bound by a promise made only to himself” (238). Where previous philosophies limited action to prevent its inherent frustrations, Arendt’s philosophy acknowledges the problems of acting and turns to inherent faculties for a solution. So while Arendt might reemphasize the idea behind a Greek polis with regard to private and public spheres, I think that her ultimate direction is to turn on Plato’s idea of ordering the self and instead seeks to use action as a liberating element of self, prompting interaction on both a social and political level.
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