Monday, February 27, 2017

Discussion Starter: Failing to Reconcile "On Liberty" and "Utilitarianism"

In Utilitarianism, Mill’s primary purpose was to articulate a theory that gave individuals a metric by which they could judge their actions; in short, actions should promote social utility, or for Mill, contribute to the happiness of a society per the greatest happiness principle. Mill’s specific prescription was that we should act so as to promote “the greatest amount of happiness altogether.”

Moving into On Liberty, Mill puts forth “one very simple formula, as entitled to govern the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion” (Introduction). Practically, this is just Mill’s liberty principle, that the government should only limit an individual’s liberty for the purpose of preventing harm. Mill seeks to apply this principle to thought (opinion) and action, discussing liberty in both areas. 

Mill opens his argument by stating that he will present his ‘liberty principle’ as a utilitarian. Here, I take issue; Mill doesn’t necessarily do this, throwing into question how one can argue for both liberty and the greatest happiness / least harm in society.

Mill’s argument in chapter two is for liberty and freedom of opinion. He presents the argument that “if all of mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.” Taken through the lens of utilitarianism, this is counterintuitive. Say that the single contrary opinion was so offensive and repulsive that it caused all of mankind (minus the one) to suffer psychological injury just from hearing it; allowing for the individual liberty to speak that opinion breaks from the utilitarianism ideal that the benefit to the majority outweighs actions against the minority. This ties into the modern discussion about safe spaces, where though an individual’s opinions might be valid and even true, they should not be spoken in a specific context. Even if an individual’s opinion is not necessarily wrong (as Mill addresses that we can never be sure if an opinion is false), can that opinion still be against the greater utility, against the greater happiness, thus necessitating its suppression? In this way, liberty and utilitarianism might be incongruous. 

In a similar way, Mill runs afoul of his own utilitarian principles when discussing applications of the liberty principle, particularly when buying dangerous products, “stimulants.” Mill concedes that stimulants can be taxed as a deterrent, even though it is an infringement on an individuals liberties. However, even if we assume that an individual is purchasing a stimulant for strictly personal use, and that the individual understands the risks involved (making this different that the bridge case), what of the impact on those around the individual, or those involved with the chain of the purchase? Let’s substitute a cigarette as the “stimulant” in question. With cigarettes, second-hand smoke impacts others; the government often has to pay Medicaid benefits to individuals suffering from lung cancer caused by their personal choice to smoke. Big Tobacco companies settled a suit with the states over the issue of financial equity and liability for their sales for this same reason. Even alcohol, which Mill mentions directly, impacts others; public drunkenness, domestic violence triggered or worsened by alcoholism, and drunk/inebriated driving all reduce the general happiness and cause harm, thereby reducing utility. While Mill certainly couldn’t have had these things in mind while writing his theory, these examples undermine his authority and demonstrate that Mill’s ideal of liberty and his ideal of utilitarianism don’t necessarily fall together so neatly. 

To close, Mill’s argument on liberty simply isn’t directed through a perfectly utilitarian lens. While they are certainly closely aligned, I can’t accept that one can have liberty as Mill describes it while still subscribing to and following the general happiness principle; at some point, one must decide to either prioritize a liberty or the general welfare of society.

1 comment:

  1. The incompatibilities between Mill’s “On Liberty" and “Utilitarianism" are the cause of apprehension, since each theory stands on its own. Yet it appears these ideas don’t comport with each other, as Gowan asserted and defended with examples. It certainly seems that Mill overlooked the linking of his theories, thus we have these contradictions on the overlaps. Yet it would be interesting to analyze in what context we can portray the liberty principle as a facet of utilitarian thought. The only argument I see that could be made for utilitarian liberty is in a long timeframe. Here, one has the preservation of absolute liberty with no regard to the temporary unhappiness it could cause, as in the long term liberty will result in more happiness then prioritizing short-term happiness. This is essentially gerrymandering time increments in order to bring validity to a theory (therefore I’m not very confident this could reconcile the aforementioned problems).

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