Impartial Observer

Adam Smith asserts man can never reach true sympathy for a person suffering. He can only imagine how he might feel in the same circumstance, but he will never reach the degree or "violence" of the person who experiences it because our own "safety" and comfort as well as separation from the offending object constantly "intrude" on our efforts to induce a sympathetic state in ourselves. Thus, sympathy is never enough, as the "sole consolation" for the sufferer is "to see the emotions of their hearts, in every respect, beat time to his own, in the violent and disagreeable passions" (Smith, 28).

To feel connected to the observer, the original sufferer is likely to dampen her feelings to be in "concord" with the degree of sentiment expressible by the observer, who feels only to the extent of his ability to imagine the situation. It is this which is "sufficient for the harmony of society" (Smith, 28). Not only does the person dampen her expression of suffering for the purpose of sympathizing, but she also takes the perspective of the other person who is not suffering, thus slowly changing her perspective and allowing the calmness of the other person and reduction of violence of the sentiment to improve her spirits.

Adam Smith draws an important distinction between the Person Principally Concerned (the Sufferer) and the Impartial Spectator. First, Smith notes the "person principally concerned" -the person who has had emotions aroused by an object - has to bring his emotions down to what the spectator can go along with (Smith, 29). Then, the impartial spectator - the person observing and sympathizing with the emotionally aroused "person principally concerned" - has to enter into the sentiments of the person principally concerned (Smith, 29).

The person suffering can never reach what the observer experiences, yet the observer tries to reach what the person suffering experiences.  In trying to connect with each other these two people have to display two different sets of virtues. The person principally concerned has to "bring down emotions to what the spectator can go along with" (Smith, 30).  This requires the sufferer to demonstrate "self-denial" and "self-government" and a "command of the passions" (Smith, 29). The spectator has to restrain his selfishness and indulge his benevolent affections.  When a person does this it constitutes the perfection of human nature (Smith, 30)   Smith says these are the human qualities that deserve praise and admiration.

Smith concludes that the "perfection" of human nature is this mutual sympathy, or "love our neighbor as we love ourself" by "feeling much for others and little for ourself."   This is what it means to indulge in "benevolent affections" (Smith, 30). Smith makes clear that it is the ability to "self-command" our "ungovernable passions" through sympathizing with others that  is most virtuous. (Smith, 30)