I think that Kant's categorical imperative enables anyone struggling with such a dilemma to arrive at a conclusion relatively easily. The categorical imperative instructs you to "act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" (34). After asserting that you "ought never to proceed except in such a way that [you] could also will that [your] maxim should become a universal law" (17), Kant brings up an example that is fairly similar to turning in someone for academic dishonesty. He asks if "may [he] not, when [he] is in trouble, make a promise with the intention not to keep it?" (17); doing so would be a clear violation of traditional principles like honesty and honor, but to tell a lie would also rescue the subject from "adverse consequences" (18). The issue with this predicament is that, while Kant "could indeed will the lie, [he could] by no means [will] a universal law to lie" (18)--the categorical imperative thus stands as a bulwark against situations, such as witnessing a friend or classmate engaging in academic dishonesty, where one might be willing to make an exception and deviate from universal moral standards.
I agree with Nina’s commentary on Kant’s categorical imperative. Kant’s definition of the categorical imperative—that one should “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (24)—definitely applies here, and it seems to me that Kant would criticize someone who did not turn in a person cheating on an exam, just as Nina reasoned in her posting. This question reminded me of Kant’s example of the person who wants to borrow money and knows that they will not be able to pay it back. Kant reasons that because the universal law of such would make any promise untrustworthy, the person should not ask to borrow the money in the end (35). My question would be, to what extent is this way of thinking actually rational? Nina points out that Kant asks whether or not someone should lie without fear or moral judgement to rescue themselves from “adverse consequences” (18). While the categorical imperative would argue no, I think that it really depends on the situation the subject in question is in. Following this, if a person is being persecuted by someone who does not act morally, should they have to stand by their own morality and not save themselves?
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